středa 23. listopadu 2016




This paper is set within the unremitting colonialism that is the African tragedy. It depicts the current interventions by the West into African “corruption” as the third wave of colonialism.


The West has returned to Africa (again), this time with a focus on “corruption”. The “C” word is on everybody’s lips and is a set piece now in policy manoeuvres across Africa. Because the special style and execution of “corruption”-hunting will stand to fundamentally condition African public and cultural life for generations to come it is important to thoroughly examine western rationales that drive it. This paper acknowledges a strong interface between African “ethics” and African “corruption”. Both must be understood within the continuing context of colonialism.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First I attempt to show that the West’s construction of African “corruption” is shallow, oblivious to cultural variance and ultimately designed to serve western economic and geo-political interests under the guise of weeding out something deliberately portrayed as universally negative. Associated with that purpose is a consideration of the failure of western methodologies (e.g. anti-“corruption” commissions to impact on African profiles of wrongdoing. Make sure you do this The second purpose is to recover, and join forces with, a minority scholarship that connects “corruption” to culture, as a counterpoint to the current conceptual orthodoxy.   

Such a project is immediately faced with the difficulty of getting on to the main thoroughfares of development scholarship which are jam-packed with studies that see “corruption” through western eyes. This scholarship previously drew on public administration, sociology, political science and law. Now, since the 1990s (with clear sponsorship from trans-national bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) economics has confidently marked out its territory. Studies are in abundance now that purport to connect “corruption” to economic performance (Keefer & Knack, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Campos, Lien & Pradhan, 1999; Hope, 2000, p. 23; Abed & Gupta, 2002, ch. 1). This hyperactive scholarship services the new realities of globalisation; increased international capital flows, technology transfers and trade liberalisations. It is showing all the signs of victor scholarship.  The market, deified in the scholarship, is the gold standard against which all else must seek accommodation. This includes indigenous definitions of “corruption”, an important point in this paper.

The complete monopoly of the field is frustrated by a strident trickle of black African contributions seeking indigenous solutions to Africa’s troubles (Adedeji, 1990; Onimode, 2004, ch. 2; Kankwenda, 2004, ch. 4). The intention of this paper is to support this activity by providing a companion analysis to this balck scholarship, albeit from a western outside position. I attempt to muster an alternative view, a counterbalance to west-led development scholarship as it pertains to the issue of African “corruption”. For this purpose the paper reviews and orchestrates the works of Ekah (1975),  Harsch (1993), de Sardan (1999), and Smith (2001), into a subversive chorus against this new (and as I hope to demonstrate) flawed orthodoxy that promotes western solutions to African “corruption”. 

First I …


In February 2005 it was reported that twenty six Mauritanian cabinet ministers had awarded themselves a 600% increase in salary, in order to “fight corruption” (CNN, 2005). This story and thousands like it demand some explanation as to why this paper carries the title Does African “Corruption” Exist? One would have thought that “corruption” in Africa is a foregone reality. There is no doubt that something very serious exists. State treasuries get raided, customs officials take bribes, and elections are rigged. This we know. Who defines this as “corruption” is an extremely important question in this paper. The prerogative to define flows to the prerogative to act, which in turn flows to the prerogative to control. The power to ask and answer this question, I maintain, is ebbing from African public life, and has been for some time (Ndulo, 2003, p. 367). “Corruption”, what it is and what can be done about it, is in the process of capture by dominant western sense-making. Ahluwalia captures this well when, in making a more general point, he says:

The inability of the African state to deliver ‘development’ has meant that it is no longer permitted to engage in activities which a normal state would perform. Rather these functions have been usurped, and the African state today is entrapped within a discourse of power whereby foreign institutions and agencies map out its future. In this new configuration, it is the World Bank, the IMF and a host of non-government organizations which determine and dictate fundamental policy. They are in many respects, the new ‘colonial administrators’ (Ahluwalia 2001: 54).

A counterpoint is desperately needed, not so as to nostalgically hark back to some pre-West era but to mount some indigenously grounded ethical opposition to the tsunami of anti-“corruption” washing towards Africa, as this effort is clearly driven by western economic and political interests.  I argue that like other neo-colonial adventures, anti-“corruption” stands to bypass, and indeed further oppress the ordinary African.

A contextual point first. This new anti-“corruption” era (which has spurned a lively and lucrative anti-“corruption” industry) is but the latest in a long history of western intervention and meddling in Africa. The following table presents this era in a historical context of unremitting colonialism. Western interventions in Africa have not ceased since the Berlin Conference. Rather new incursions are layered on previous interventions. They are not swept away by history. For example religious conversion is a constant feature of western contract in Africa. Today it adopts more of a fundamental Christian look then it did in the previous missionary era of the nineteenth century. These previous interventions moderate, indeed co-shape the current era. Thus while there are specific reasons why the west is back in Africa now on an anti-“corruption” mission, the style of this era is moderated by the previous era history.

Layers of Colonialism

                       Colonial Character
Classic Colonial
Resource and human exploitation; missionaries, governance control.
Berlin Conference (1884) – 1960s
Cold War
all above + Cold War diplomatic manoeuvring
1950s - 1990s
all above + anti-“corruption” programs

1990s – continuing
all above + pro-democracy programs

1990s – continuing
all above + anti-“terrorist” programs

2000 – continuing
New Cold War
all above + geo-political manoeuvrings (USA v  China and Russia?)

There are two final points worthy of note in this scheme. The Democracy and “Terrorism” eras are considered to be coterminous with the anti-“corruption” era. We can expect a good deal of cross-referencing between the programs that separately emerge here. This area is outside the scope of the paper but some fine works are already produced here [add anti corruption/democracy/terrorism refs]. Secondly the scheme forecasts a new Cold War…[continue + refs]

Although standardised figures do not yet exist, western interventions into African “corruption” are on the dramatic increase (Michael, 2004, p. 321). We do know that from 1988 to 2007 (when the last group of currently approved programs will finish) Germany, UK, Norway, and the Netherlands together funded 194 anti-“corruption” projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, at the cost of about US$900 million.[i] These projects range from the large US$64 million grant by the UK Department of International Development to improve government services in the poor areas of Kenya to US$4,880 grant from NORAD (the Norwegian aid agency) for a survey of donors’ views on Zambian “corruption” (Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2005). In fiscal years 2001-2002 (the latest figures) US funding for anti-“corruption” projects in Sub-Saharan Africa averaged about US$33 million per year (US General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 15). It is anticipated that this level of funding will rise dramatically as a result of the recently initiated US Millennium Challenge Account that will fund US$1billion worth “good governance” projects in 2004 with significant increases proposed by 2006 (US General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 1). In 2004 the World Bank committed US$16 billion to Sub-Saharan Africa, of which more than 20% was for public sector governance, which is the main category one would expect to find the anti-‘corruption” programs (World Bank, 2005). Up to 2000 the World Bank had funded 350 specific anti-“corruption” programs to 95 donor countries, many of which are in Africa (Wolfensohn, 2000).

In this paper “corruption” is more then an oft copied entry in a western dictionary. It is a vexed, possibly indefinable idea, only making sense after one has delved the deepest parts of conflicting and usually esoteric cultural experience. I reject the western fashion to give up on this troublesome concept by detaching it from context (even though that is usually robustly denied), and reposition it, dumbed down, as the vernacular of powerful bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and emergent anti-“corruption” bodies like Transparency International and the proto-western African Union. Indeed we appear now to be at the stage where the concept is so above suspicion that new studies spend no time at all struggling with the definition of “corruption” they will apply in their work (Deininger & Mpuga 2005, p. 171).

“Corruption”, through western eyes, commonly pertains to matters such as personal conflicts of interest and extracting private benefit from public office. It is a concept drawn from the depths of western outlook. As such it is tempered with sociological naivety and other-culture indifference. The western understanding of “corruption” is determined to a great extent by the canonical power of individualism to fashion our view of this phenomenon. Individual responsibility (therefore personal culpability) is positioned in the forefront of our consciousness Family, village, history and ethnicity are pushed aside in the search for stand-alone culprits.

The western mind easily cultivates narrow and socially detached meanings for the entirety of its core characteristics. “Corruption” is a case in point. It is defined as the malpractice of individual rogue citizens (although rivers of ink write the counter narrative about the systemic nature of “corruption”) who have gained privately from positions of public trust. True to that logic “corruption”, through western eyes, free from the need to negotiate cultural “noise, is deemed to be a trans-cultural “disease” that must be surgically removed from all sovereign states. Hope has referred to “corruption” as the “AIDS of democracy” (2000, p. 17). Former World Bank head, James Wolfensohn, saw “corruption” as a “cancer” and even the recent Commission on Africa report described “corruption” as a “spreading rot” (p. 32). Riley, implausibly, sees nothing “African” about African “corruption”. “It is”, he says, “part of the strong global growth in corruption” (2000, p. 138).

In this paper “corruption” is not uniform, nor is it constant. Rather it is ephemeral and socially-shaped. The reality of cultural variance requires the essence of “corruption” to remain permanently the subject of disputation about moral standards that should apply to the bearers of public trust and duty. At the very least this position validates non-westernised African voices in the discourses about “corruption” and targets the West’s self-elected mandate to determine the boundaries of this discourse and penetrate African public policy.

The irony is that the synthetically simple definitions of “corruption” utilised by the West in Africa have not produced any reliable measures of the practice. Nor have projects predicated on these definitions achieved success.[ii] This is partly to do with non-rational, politicised decisions as to where the anti-“corruption dollars go. Michael has discerned no correlation between alleged “corruption” prevalence and anti-‘corruption” spending in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 324-325).

While we in the West seem confident that we “know” what “corruption” is, we don’t, it appears, know how to measure it or eradicate it. The best we seem to be able to come up are methodologies deeming to measure perceptions of “corruption”. Western governments are starting to commit their resources to the “clean up” of Africa on the basis of these flawed measures.[iii]  What is drawing the West back to Africa?

The recent emergence of an internationalised attack on African “corruption” is partly the result of major geo-political shifts by the USA and its western Europe allies following the end of the Cold War (Williams, 1999, p. 487; Riley, 2000, p. 140; Alesina & Weder, 2002). The old game of propping up African dictators to variably encourage or prevent the spread of Communism and gain access to cheap natural resources and easy import markets, has given way to a new interest by the big western powers in corrupt-free administrations. “Corruption” is now the common weed in the new open market seed beds cultivated by strategically positioned western companies. For example, in 2002 United States trade with sub-Saharan Africa was valued at nearly $24 billion and US direct investment in the region currently exceeds US$10 billion.

“Corruption”, once the concern of moralists, is now confronted by a politics driven by expansionist economic and political interests. Simply put, the new mantra is, “corruption is not good for [First World] trade”. It is seen to distort the cash nexus, requires expensive regulatory regimes, shelters inefficiency and retards competition (Centre for International Private Enterprise, 2003; US General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 4). The solutions are the old Bretton-Woods shibboleths such as trade liberalisation and privatisation. Competition from imports is believed to produce efficiencies, cleanse the local market of state-caused un-productivity, and guaranteeing lower commodity prices. World Bank officials are now saying that growth in Africa must be driven by private investment in “corruption” free climates (Deinginger & Mpugu 2005, p. 171).

October 1996 is a good marker year for the start of western intervention into African” corruption”. In that year World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, and IMF managing director, Michael Camdessus controversially announced that from henceforth they would use their donor leverage with African countries to stamp out “corruption” (Op De Beke, 2000, p. 255).

In the following section four [will they remain 4?] works in minority scholarship are featured. The purpose is to provide a counterpoint to the western monopolised anti=”corruption” debate.
INDIGENOUS TAKEAWAY [Maybe Indigenous contexts or something]

Commenting on a report accusing numerous top officials of corruption.
the Gambian President Yahya Jammeh said recently:

Heads will roll. I will deal with anybody whose name appeared negatively in the report. There will be no sacred cow. Even if my mother is on these pages I will deal with her.

Notwithstanding the histrionics, this is a very curious statement on a number of levels. Is it genuine or contrived? If contrived, for what purpose? If it is genuine what???

Ekeh and the Two Publics

The distinction between public and private is a peculiar western philosophical achievement. Yet does it deserve colonisation worldwide? While these worlds are different they have a common moral unity. The western conception of “corruption” for example, assumes no ethical division between the public world and the private world. There are no parallel moral universes. All is melded. Doing good (or bad) in the family, the home or the ethnic group is the same as doing good (or bad) in public. Ekeh says that this synthesized morality does not transfer easily to Africa.  There is a private realm but he insists that it is differentially associated with two public moral universes; the primordial public and the civic public (1975, p. 92). The former operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm. The latter is associated with the colonial administration and based on the civil structures such as military and the police. It has become identified with popular politics in the African post-colony (p. 92). Its major characteristic is that it has no moral linkages with the private moral realm. In fact Ekeh goes as far as saying that the civic public is amoral. Thus we have political actors operating in two realms; a moral-based primordial realm and a moral-free (or moral-muted) civic realm. If that is the case the “corruption” cannot exist, as no standards to measure the alleged abuse exist. It is the dialectic conflict between both realms that characterise for Ekeh the shape of modern Afric politics.

Life in the primordial public (e.g. life in post-colonial tribal-familial clusters) is a life full of obligations to the larger group and concern for its welfare and continuity. The group, or culture, or history is transcendent. The group member is merely an ingredient in its value or a moment in its continuity. In return for looking out for the group, the member receives identity, psychological comfort (p. 107). These are non-transactional as they are in the West. In other words the obligations to the primordial public are not offered in exchange for rights.

This is out of kilter with the western conception which endorses a transactional balance between rights and obligations. In the West, rights are extracted from the body politic (e.g. the right to practice a particular religion) in return for generalised citizenship obligations (e.g. to tolerate the religious beliefs of others). Or to  rephrase this in the idiom of the paper; one has, as a right, access to a free market in which all are obliged to act incorruptly. In this context ‘corruption” is not (and can never be) systemic. It is the behaviour of individual rogues breaching moral standards that are as applicable to private life as to public life. There is no disconnection here. Dishonesty makes as much sense in family life as it does in business activity.

However African life in the civic public is another thing again. Ekeh says that while many Africans bend over backwards to benefit and sustain their primordial public, they seek to gain from their involvement in the civic public:

…the individual’s relationship with the civic public is measured in material terms…While the individual seeks to gain from the civic public, there is no moral urge on him to give back to the civic public in return for his benefits…Duties…are de-emphasised while rights are squeezed out of the civic public with the amorality of the artful dodger (p. 107).

For Ekeh, the unwritten law is that it is legitimate to rob the civic public as long as the purpose is to strengthen the primordial public. Practices defined in law as “fraud” and embezzlement” are sanctioned (or at the very least, tolerated) as long as the target is the government not organic clusters such as extended families, neighbourhood etc.

Ekeh traces this necessary anti-state sentiment to the colonial period and the ensuing struggles for independence across the African continent. These struggles entailed sabotage of colonial administration through absenteeism, pilfering, strikes, tax evasion and the like (p. 102). For Ekeh, the irony is that these subversive activities did not stop at independence. They carried over to post-colonial rule. The author has witnessed similar transfer effects in the countries of the former Soviet Republic such as Poland and Hungary. For many, no moral standareds were breached in actions against the hated states in both countries. It was a matter of survival under unpleasant regimes not morality SAY BETTER.
Smith and the Igbos

Up until now, “corruption” has been deemed an unsuitable topic of study for ethnographers. Smith’s fieldwork in Nigeria with the Igbo-speaking community of Ubakala is one of the few ethnographic studies of African “corruption (2001). Nigeria is regularly rated amongst the most “corrupt” counties in the world by organisations such as Transparency International and the World Bank Institute. One can suggest that what we are measuring in these surveys is not indigenous Nigerian “corruption’ patterns as much as western failure to eradicate a western construct (“corruption”) from the public life of Nigeria. Formulaic western solutions are based on a view that “corruption” is produced in non-variable patterns within the state by elites or aspirant elites with access to power (Achebe, 1983, p. 38). Smith’s special contribution is that he diverts our gaze from this explanation onto kinship realities where “corruption” is reproduced by ordinary people. In this respect he is very close to Ekeh, whose work was considered above (Smith, 2001, p. 345).

Smith concluded from his study that ordinary Nigerians had a stake in reproducing “corruption” and that what may appear to be “corruption” can look like moral behaviour from local perspectives…as they navigate Nigeria’s clientelistic political economy” (p. 345). But he warns that this explanation is not totally satisfactory as “people condemn the very practices in which they participate and lament the effects of a system they feel obliged to reproduce” (p. 346).

The Nigerian political economy is really a moral economy in which the spoils of the state (e.g. tariff revenues) are distributed totally or partially through horizontal and vertical networks of patronage. Who says this is wrong? Perhaps only rich donor countries on the other side of the globe with laws of distribution and sanctions against mal-distribution. However these countries make little of the gaping asymmetries that exist between their own very rich and their very poor. Who says the Nigerian moral economy is right/ According to Smith no one he interviewed could justify it. SO WHAT???

Among the Igbos that Smith studied were people who accessed needed resources through reciprocity and obligation practices long embedded in family, lineage and community (p. 350). Why? Because western forms of access through highly organised welfare state programs, expansive markets and adequate salaries (among a list of many pre-conditions) is not part of the Nigerian political economy.  Yet in their absence the West judges such access behaviour as “corrupt”. NOT WELL SAID

Every person in the 13 villages that Smith researched in Ubakala was expected to assist members of his or her patrilineage (umunna), matrilineage (umunne), and a host of connections created by ties of residence and association (p. 351). In Ekeh’s concept, previously considered this is the weblike primordial public.  

However these give and take transactions are governed by subtle conventions that would escape all westerners bar those with the eye of the insider. Smith’s education example shows how the indigenous line is drawn between “corruption” and legality. Nneka scored well on her secondary schools admission test but not good enough to guarantee entry to the school desired by her parents. Nnek’a mother found out that her sister had a friend in the Federal Ministry of Education in Lagos. The friend said she would try and get Nneka admitted to the favoured school by having her name on the minister’s discretionary list. The parents had to pay the women a considerable some for this. By now the western eye has identified a “corrupt” act. But is it so? Not according to Smith. Even though then payment was an essential part of the process, he maintains from the ethnographic evidence that it was not a bribe (p. 353). The thing that made inclusion on the discretionary list possible was not the money but the connection. As Smith explains:

The money actually represented a social distance in the connection. The woman in the ministry almost surely would have refused any [payment] to help her own sister’s daughter. A complete stranger offering money to get on the ‘Minister’s list’ would likely have been rejected outright…To accept money from a stranger to facilitate admission of a child who was not qualified based on her exam result is wrong: the rules of the state apply in such an impersonal case. To help your relation get admission when her scores were below the cut-off is expected and morally justified: the [moral] rules of kinship, community and reciprocity apply when the stakes are personal/communal (p. 353).


Harsch and that Definition

De Sardan’s noteworthy thesis on African “corruption”:

Corruption has become in almost all African countries a common and routine element of the functioning of the …[state] from top to bottom. This being the case, corruption is neither marginal, or sectoralised or repressed, but is generalised and banalised (1999, p. 28).

He attributes five “logics”, found deep in African culture, to this process of banalisation. Briefly, these are; negotiation, gift-giving, solidarity networks, predatory authority, and redistributive accumulation.

Diamond for example takes the view that African “corruption” is not a breach of ethics but a mechanism that serves public order by organising competition into networks of clients and patrons (Diamond, 1987, p. 579). Bates, on another tack, sees the dodging and manoeuvring of African farmers as the life preserving actions of an oppressed group avoiding the deprivations inflicted by government action (Bates, 1981, p. 87). In the same vein, a 2003 study by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime found that “corruption” in South Africa was part of the “national psyche” (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003a).

Western anti-corruption engagements in Africa too often appear oblivious to this argument, preferring to intervene through a portal that proclaims “corruption” a universally nasty issue.

The recent Commission on Africa Report made the same point when it argued for a more culturally-appropriate understanding of patron-client relationships because they reveal something about the “African senses of community” (Commission on Africa, 2005, p. 25). We know for example that attempts by the Tanzanian government to protect its local coffee industry from foreign capture was interpreted through western eyes as condoning clientalistic and rent-seeking practices, the commonly presented symptoms of “corruption”, when, arguably, all the government was doing was pursuing nationalistic objectives (Ponte, 2004, p. 616). If we are compelled to define “corruption” as deviations from social norms and duties of office, we should also be compelled to ask “whose norms” and “which duties”? (Qizilbash, 2001, p. 273). This discourse happens less then it should.


Somewhere hre say that we live in portentous times. Wolfowitz appointment, UN Millenium Goals (est 2000 to slashglobal poverty by half by 2015) the UN COnference on theMillenium Goals in September this year

This paper has positioned itself at the start of the third such paradigm mutation in West/Africa relationships. The stages are above. Where do they go/The 1880s-1960s colonial period re-formed as an era of foreign aid. Notwithstanding massive new donor injections into Africa (such as the USA’s current $5 billion Millennium Challenge Account) there are significant indications of widespread dissatisfaction that foreign aid has pushed Africa into deeper levels of poverty and higher levels of “corruption”. After about sixty years (roughly 1960s-2020), the early signs are there that neo-colonialism’s “charity” period is coming to an end. The third period, the “anti-corruption” era, is now emerging, being driven by the demands of international capital for “corrupt” free markets.[iv] The structural adjustments forced on Africa, clearly observed in the large scale privatisations that have taken place, have served the long term goal of making Africa safe for trade and  resource exploitation.

The direction taken in the paper will hopefully stimulate new research in a number of emerging areas. One concerns the effects of the colonisation of western “corruption” management practices on indigenous processes that have traditionally responded to issues of local deviance. The anthropological and sociological literature is surprisingly silent in this area. Deviance control has traditionally been affixed to the work list of families, villages and more recently, sovereign states. Ahluwalia captures this colonisation issue well when he says:

The inability of the African state to deliver ‘development’ has meant that it is no longer permitted to engage in activities which a normal state would perform. Rather these functions have been usurped, and the African state today is entrapped within a discourse of power whereby foreign institutions and agencies map out its future. In this new configuration, it is the World Bank, the IMF and a host of non-government organizations which determine and dictate fundamental policy. They are in many respects, the new ‘colonial administrators’ (Ahluwalia 2001: 54).

Finally one can see on the near horizon the beginning of a new scramble for Africa by China, and to a lesser extent India and other countries. At a recent oil and gas conference in Cape Town, one speaker produced a map of Africa, highlighting new Asian oil interests: it was a forest of Chinese flags (Economist, 2004, p. 87). A China-Africa Business Council was formed in Beijing in November 2004 and China has financially supported for two years in a row (2003-2004) the activities of the African Union. Predictions are that two-way trade will grow to $30 billion within two years. The relevance of this is that there are already suggestions that the new economic interfaces between African governments and China will be an ethics-free zone. The same Economist report says:

Unlike their increasingly publicity-sensitive western rivals, the Chinese have no qualms about making deals with oil-rich dictators, however corrupt or nasty. State-owned China National Petroleum Corporation, eager for secure long-term supplies, has bought 40% of a large project in Sudan. Chinese workers recently built a 1,600km pipeline there, in just 11 months (Economist, 2004, p. 87).

There is no doubt Ahluwalia opens up some very enticing research possibilities here. If indigenous leadership on all manner of deviance (including what might locally be defined as “corruption”) is being sidelined what will be the long term social and economic effect? Or perhaps this supplantation process is not as advanced as I suggest it is here. In that case, is there an undocumented hybridisation of local-transnational anti-corruption programs flourishing beneath the research radar? I am not aware of any research evaluations of the reductive impact of either western-initiated or hybridised anti-corruption programs.

This important document report contemplates a massive and sustained injection of grant-based funds into a debt-relieved and “corruption”-proofed Africa. Behind the sincere expressions of concern for Africa’s plight, and the many sensible suggestions, lays an unexamined foundation of powerful assumptions about Africa and the West.

The re-identification of neo-colonialism as a vital context in African “development” is then demonstrated through two short case studies that show how recent western interventions into African economies produce deleterious impacts on indigenous social structure and economic behaviour
Check out

Englebert’s Framework
                                                Loss of Functionality

Don’t know where this table is to go but it’s a beauty! Maybe put it into African ethics paper
A feature of neo-colonialist economic outlook is that corruption is inimical to growth. Most analyses would favour this conclusion (Maoro 1995; Paul 1995). Yet how do we account for the high corruption-high growth countries of East Asia? (Campos, Lien & Pradhan 1999, p. 1059). The following table simply collects together recent GDP and corruption figures for   ???

[i] This figure is a general indicator. It comes from the Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre database. Euro values have been converted to US dollar values at the exchange rate for 31 March 2005.
[ii] In fact there is now a literature pointing to western anti-“corruption” programming as a new source of “corruption”. See Hanlon, 1991, 1996, 2002, 2004.
[iii] Berlin based anti-corruption NGO Transparency International, in conjunction with the Internet Centre for Corruption Research at the University of Passau in Germany, has been publishing the international corruption perception index (CPI) since 1995.  The CPI annually rank orders an increasing number of countries in terms of perceptions of corruption. The CPI is now the subject of methodological controversy (Galtung, 2005). The other major corruption perception index is done by the World Bank Institute (WBI). WBI produced its first corruption index in 1996, and updates it every two years. At the time of writing the 2002 survey was the most recent available. The WBI Index covers twice as many Sub-Saharan counties as the TI Index because it will assess a country on the basis of one survey, whereas the TI Index requires a minimum of three surveys per country. Both TI and WBI indexes assess perceptions rather then actual incidence of “corruption”.  Because of the similarities in data sources, there is a high correlation between TI and WBI indexes. As such, both these instruments are imprecise. As far as the paper is concerned the biggest failings of these indexes are that they rely on Western definitions of “corruption”, yet claim to be measuring universal phenomena, and the data is based on what respondents perceive to be “corruption”.  Country level “corruption” surveys are done from time to time. However it is the TI and WBI indexes which produce the most publicity and influence the flow of anti-corruption resources from the West. African governments are becoming vocal in their condemnation of these indexes.
[iv] There are signs that a fourth paradigm is emerging just behind the anti-“corruption” framework. This is an anti-terrorist paradigm. Africa, once the alleged abode of communists during the Cold War, is now seen as a host for terrorism. This US led interest in African security will interact with the new anti-“corruption” paradigm in ways still too early to understand. See (Volman, 1993; Taylor, 1999).

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